Evolution of forms and methods of warfare.
The study of the experience of conducting military operations of the 40th A allows us to draw conclusions about the evolution of the forms and methods of routing the largest groups of the armed opposition.
carrying out operations to defeat the most dangerous groups of the armed opposition; defense of communications, regime zones, important national economic objects; ambush operations of units and subunits in the general system of sudden and secretive strikes by the army; fighting for the implementation of reconnaissance data by the army on duty and means; fighting for wiring columns with material and technical means in especially dangerous directions; covering the state border.
Analysis of the forms of combat activity, types of operations, methods of their conduct and the defeat of individual enemy groupings made it possible to reveal their structural and logical dependence.
air-ground over the defeat of large enemy groupings and its base areas; offensive with the aim of breaking through the enemy’s defense and providing combat activity to the surrounding points of permanent deployment of units and units of the 40th A and Afghan troops; defensive on the main road routes, especially during the withdrawal period.
The analysis of the conducted operations allowed to divide them into two types – planned and unplanned. A total of 426 planned and 47 unscheduled operations were conducted. They differed in terms of tasks, methods and levels of planning, the forces and means involved.
the system of defensive positions of battalions and guard posts and posts in a company, platoon; a fire destruction system with prepared areas of concentrated artillery fire in the entire strip, continuous multi-layered and multi-tiered fire from all types of weapons within reach, prepared fire maneuver in any threatened direction or sector, incl. precision weapons and associated with the means of destruction of reconnaissance and signaling equipment (SAR) “Realia-U”; a system of engineering obstacles, the basis of which consisted of continuous minefields on the outskirts of the outposts, special mine fields with the help of the Okhota-2 kits installed on the probable directions of the rebels’ exit to the road and in the ravines; a system of ambushes on the probable ways of actions of subversive groups of the enemy; a reconnaissance system that included continuous reconnaissance operations of reconnaissance battalions of divisions, reconnaissance regiments of the regiments and reconnaissance platoons of battalions to obtain information about the most dangerous detachments of rebels, their plans of action in conjunction with the activity of intelligence, aerial, radio engineering, artillery reconnaissance, intelligence of the MGB and MIA ; a system of reserve, patrol armored groups and artillery groups designed to repel an attack and destroy enemy sabotage groups; a system for controlling the movement of columns by the forces of the road commandant’s brigade of the army through the creation of commandant sites, road-commandant posts, mobile and fixed control posts; system of movement of columns and curfews, regulating the order of the movement of columns, their composition, security, traffic schedule, places for day and night rest, time of beginning and end of the march, management procedure; the control system for the defensive actions of the units, units of the army, which included the center of command and control (CBU) and the central dispatch center (CPD) of the army, the division of the Central Bank of the divisions, regiments, command posts of battalions, the mouth and guard posts. At the same time, with all the battalions there was a closed design bureau and VHF radio communication on the R-145 type KShM, a single separate artillery control system, a single VHF radio network for controlling the movement of the columns on the march, which allowed the army commander through an air retransmitter and divisional control centers to have a connection with each a company, a guard post, columns on the routes and take timely measures to destroy the enemy by the forces and means of ar in areas of responsibility.
The main methods of conducting operations and methods of destroying individual enemy groups had their own peculiarities.
weak and unsystematic control over the performance of security and defense services on the roads by commanders of formations, units, and also the army headquarters; Inadequate knowledge of the personnel of the units for the protection of the tactics of the rebels, the lack of a clear, organized observation of the terrain; low tactical training commanders of security units, which led to a straightforward solution to combat missions to curb the rebel attack on military columns.
In connection with the changed tactics and the appearance of new forms and methods of actions, the tactic of conducting military operations of the Soviet troops was also improved. Thus, the analysis of the depen- dence of personnel losses only on rebel sabotage shows that, if in 1980 the insurgents committed 35 sabotage operations, in 1981 the number of sabotage increased eightfold and amounted to 264. Accordingly, the losses of the personnel of the OK SV increased from 1384. a man killed and wounded to 2,042 people.
The main attention in the military operations of the army was given to the actions of the combat groups that were established before June 9, 1981 and began to operate on the night of 9 to 10 June. Combat groups were created from the calculation in each regiment – 4-5 groups, and in reconnaissance battalions – 5 each.
The actions of the Soviet troops in the operations of 1982 were characterized by the following features: a tight blockage by militant groups of rebels with seizure of dominant heights, roofs of houses to monitor roads and streets; overlapping of the main ways of the rebels’ exit from the encirclement ring, using armored subunits and artillery barrage; the implementation of the filtration of the population in the daytime and the prevention of the departure of the rebels beyond the ring of the cordon both during the day and at night; combing the terrain by forces of Afghanistan, Khad, Tsarandoya; the creation of a strong mobile reserve to solve suddenly arising tasks to defeat the rebels, trying to break through the ring of encirclement; a powerful bomb-assault strike against air defense assets and strong points in the initial period of the operation, with the transition to aviation support during the operation; a massive use of an assault force to block the area of combat operations; extensive use of lighting to prevent the breakthrough by the rebels of the encirclement ring at night; use of testimony of prisoners in the interests of accomplishing the tasks; the use of loud-speaker installations for ideological influence on the population and the enemy; the organization and commission of marches in the mountains in conditions of widespread use by rebels of debris, destruction and mining; Creation of KP, ZKP and TPU, which ensured qualitative performance of assigned tasks; limited use of military equipment because of severely broken terrain (armored groups were used mainly for the protection of routes, command posts and night recreation areas); the secrecy was ensured by the product of all regroupings in the night conditions with observance of camouflage measures, which made it possible to strike the rebels unexpectedly, and also to forbid their retreat; the creation of consolidated units from Soviet and Afghan military personnel for joint operations under the leadership of Soviet commanders.
Thus, the methods of conducting military operations were influenced by three most important factors:
In this connection, since 1986, private combat operations in the area of responsibility for units and units under the plan of divisional commanders (units) have been widely used, with the introduction of the organizational core and its subsequent consolidation on the basis of the plan for the expansion of people’s power approved by the Central Committee of the PDPA.
It is quite obvious that this required surprise, high rates of nomination, skilful use of airborne assault and bypassing detachments, which together allowed preempting the actions of the rebels and causing them tangible losses.
Author: Evgueni Nikitenko, Major-General.
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